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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MAURINE ELG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No
14169

v.
BOYD FITZGERALD and VALLEY
VIEW RIDING STABLES,
Defendants an.d Respondents

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL

POINT I
MATERIAL NOT PART OF THE RECORD MAY BE RELIED UPON
AS A REASON FOR REMOVAL.
Counsel for defendant-respondent asserts that in his
opinion "it is totally improper to set forth matters which are
held in chambers without a court reporter.11

In the opinion of

the Supreme Court of the United States:
"Material which is not part of the
record may be relied upon by the Supreme
Court as a reason for remand." Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U. S. 66, 17 L. Ed. 2d 737,
87 S. Ct. 793.
The author of Appeal and Error in 4 Am. Jur. 2d §487, under the
heading "Contradiction of Explanation by Matter Dehors Record,1'
noted that:
11

. . . evidence (such as statements by
the trial judge) can be received which
does not contradict the record, but explains
it."
Thus, the opinion of counsel for the defendant-respondent is contrary to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court.

-2Appellant, in her Brief, attempted to advise the
Supreme Court of the statements of the trial judge in chambers
prior to trial and Appellant submits that such evidence can
be received as long as "it does not contradict the record, but
explains it.ff

In her Brief, Appellant argues that the trial

judge told Appellant's counsel that he would not apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to this case because he did not
believe it was still the law in the State of Utah.

To the

contrary, Respondent argues that the trial judge inquired as
to whether Appellant intended to rely on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur and that counsel for Appellant advised the court
that he did not.

Now, which position ndoes not contradict

the record, but explains it11?
The record reveals that counsel for Respondent argued
in his Motion to Dismiss as follows;
"We admit it was an unfortunate accident,
but res ipsa doesn't apply in this instance.
The plaintiff has proved nothing except res
ipsa." (Emphasis added) (Tr. 163: 16-18)
Now where did counsel for Respondent get the idea
that "res ipsa didn't apply to this case?"
obvious.

The answer is

He was merely paraphrasing the statement of the trial

judge in chambers that he would not apply res ipsa to this case.
POINT II
THE COMPLAINT IS SUFFICIENT TO APPRISE RESPONDENT
OF APPELLANT'S INTENTION TO RELY ON THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR.

-3Next, Respondent argues that Appellant did not
plead res ipsa loquitur in her Complaint and did not make
specific her request that the doctrine be considered at the time
of trial.

Respondent cites Joseph v. W. H. Groves1 Latter Day

Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P. 2d 935 as follows:
"We think one who wishes to rely on that
doctrine, as well as specifically assigned
acts of negligence, must so plead, either
by separate count or proper allegation to
the effect that the negligence to be inferred from the general situation caused
the injury, thereby notifying the other
party that he intends to rely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." (Emphasis
added)
The above citation does not appear in the Joseph
case.

That counsel for Respondent would attempt to argue a

citation which does not appear in the case cited is either
unethical or very sloppy work.

Nevertheless, even the language

cited by Respondent's counsel, wherever it came from, provides
that a plaintiff may satisfy the pleading requirement by a
proper allegation "to the effect that the negligence to be
inferred from the general situation caused the injury" and such
an allegation is adequate notification to the other party that the
plaintiff intends to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In plaintifffs Complaint the following allegation
was made:
"On or about October 6, 1973 at approximately 8:00 o'clock p.m., defendant
Boyd F. Fitzgerald and defendant Valley
View Riding Stables by and through one

-4-

of their agents, employees or servants
negligently allowed approximately 29
people to board a haywagon which was
unsafe and in poor condition and thereafter negligently drove said haywagon
in such a manner as to cause almost all
of the people on said wagon to be thrown
off of the wagon to the ground."
In light of the general policy to allow pleadings to
allege facts and not specific, technical causes of action, the
Complaint filed herein contains sufficient indications of
reliance on the situation as well as specific acts of the defendants and the plaintiff is not precluded from relying on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in addition to specific acts of
negligence alleged.

The purpose of such general or situational

allegations is to place the defendant on notice of the plaintifffs
intention to so rely on res ipsa.

In this case, not only do the

pleadings allege that defendant was negligent in allowing 29
people to become involved in such a dangerous situation, but
counsel for the plaintiff also made it perfectly clear in chambers
and in every other way possible that it was his intention to rely
upon the doctrine of res ipsa in addition to specific acts of
negligence, such as the driving of defendant's agent, or the maintenance of the vehicle by the defendant or his agents, etc.
The notice aspect of pleadings has been enunciated in
this court in Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 99 Ut. 496,
108 P. 254, where pleadings were required to "put the defendant on notice that the plaintiff is going to rely on the situation itself to furnish any inference or negligence."

Loos,

-5-

supra, at 259.

Loos was later explained by this court in Capitol

Electric Co. v. Campbell, 217 P. 2d 392, at 396-397, where the
court said:
"In the case of Loos v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 99 Utah 496, 108 P. 254,
we allowed a recasting of the pleadings to make more certain the issue of
res ipsa loquitur. But in that case,
we reversed the judgment because of
error in. instructing on the issues
raised by allegations of specific negligence and refusal to instruct on the
issue of res ipsa loquitur when there
was no evidence to support such allegations of specific negligence, but there
was evidence to support the issue of res
ipsa loquitur. In short, when we
reversed for error, we permitted a new
trial and allowed amendments."
This shows the serious nature of refusal to recognize res ipsa
by the trial court, and the Supreme Court's willingness to constru(
pleadings liberally.
Once the evidence supports submission under the general
res ipsa doctrine, the court should consider it (assuming some
notice has been timely given to the defendant).

This position

has been taken by this court in Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter
Day Saints Hospital, supra, where the issue was the trial court's
refusal to include res ipsa.
11

The court stated:

. . . under proper circumstances neither
the failure to expressly plead res ipsa
loquitur, nor the fact that specific acts
of negligence are proved, would preclude
the submission of the case on that doctrine, [now] we proceed to consider the
most fundamental proposition: Whether the
evidence here would have justified submission of the case upon that theory."

-6-

The face of the pleading contains a general allegation
of negligence attributable to the situation (hay ride) in paragraph 4, which states:
n

. . . defendant . . . negligently
allowed approximately 29 people to
board a haywagon which was unsafe
i«

The specific acts alleged were also in this paragraph:
11

. . . and thereafter negligently
drive said haywagon in such a manner
as to cause almost all of the people
on said wagon to be thrown off of the
wagon to the ground.11
POINT III
ONCE APPELLANT HAS ESTABLISHED A CASE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR, THE BURDEN IS CAST UPON THE RESPONDENT TO MAKE PROOF
OF WHAT HAPPENED.
Counsel for Respondent also states that

Tl

nowhere can

this writer (counsel for Respondent) find any law which states
that the burden of proof shifts, as Appellant has alleged."

In

Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 351 P. 2d 952, 10 Ut. 2d 276
(1960), the Utah Supreme Court answered this charge as follows:
"This argument practically ignores
the purpose of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, namely, to permit one
who suffers injury from something
under the control of another, which
ordinarily would not cause the injury
except for the other's negligence, to
present his grievance to a court or
jury on the basis of the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from such facts;
and cast the burden upon the other to
make proof of what happened.11 (Emphasis
added)
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POINT IV
RESPONDENT HAD CONTROL OF THE SITUATION AND WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALITY (HAYWAGON) WHICH CAUSED
THE APPELLANT'S INJURY.
Finally, Respondent argues that nthe only logical explanation of any witness" as to what caused the accident was that of
Eva Gains, whose explanation was

,f

that the guitar player fell and

caused the railing to break.11
It is submitted again that if the haywagon was so unstable
that if one man lost his balance and fell that it would cause
everyone else to fall off of the haywagon that the Respondent
was negligent in inviting people to use his haywagon for a hayride when it was not safe to be used for such a purpose.

It is

also submitted that if there was some danger in allowing the man
to stand that the driver of the haywagon, who was sitting almost
next to the man, had a duty to warn him of the instability of
the haywagon and the reasonable consequences of what might foreseeably happen if he fell.

No such warning was given.

(Tr. 193:

14-29)
In regard to the necessary "control over the instrumentality which caused the injury," the Utah Supreme Court in
Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 302 P. 2d 471, 5 Ut. 2d
373 (1956), has made the following observations:
11

. . . it would seem more accurate
to appraise the situation in terms of
the defendants1 responsibility for the
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instrumentality, its condition or
function, rather than merely its
control . . . ."
In the subject case, the Defendant-Respondent had a
"responsibility11 to provide a haywagon for the hayride to paying
customers that was in good "condition11 and would "function" in
such a way that in the normal course of events which were likely
to be encountered on a typical hayride and would not result in
dumping some 29 passengers into the roadway causing serious
injury to the Plaintiff-Appellant.

The Respondent had "control"

over the haywagon, that the accident occurred without any participation of the Appellant or other riders and it was the kind of
accident which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had due care been observed by Respondent.

Under such

facts and proof, the Appellant should be entitled to a recovery
for the serious injuries she suffered.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
district court should be reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
MORGAN, SCALLEY, LUNT & KIMBLE

STEPHEN G. MORGAN
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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